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People frequently receive performance feedback that describes how well they 
achieved in the past, and how they could improve in future. In educational contexts, 
future-oriented (directive) feedback is often argued to be more valuable to learners 
than past-oriented (evaluative) feedback; critically, prior research led us to predict 
that it should also be better remembered. We tested this prediction in six experiments. 
Subjects read written feedback containing evaluative and directive comments, which 
supposedly related to essays they had previously written (Experiments 1-2), or to 
essays another person had written (Experiments 3-6). Subjects then tried to reproduce 
the feedback from memory after a short delay. In all six experiments, the data 
strongly revealed the opposite effect to the one we predicted: despite only small 
differences in wording, evaluative feedback was in fact recalled consistently better 
than directive feedback. Furthermore, even when adult subjects did recall directive 
feedback, they frequently misremembered it in an evaluative style. These findings 
appear at odds with the position that being oriented toward the future is advantageous 
to memory. They also raise important questions about the possible behavioral effects 
and generalizability of such biases, in terms of students’ academic performance.   
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A memory advantage for past-oriented over future-oriented performance 
feedback 
In almost any profession or pastime—from education, to business, to sports 
and the performing arts—being able to improve our skills can hinge on receiving 
good quality feedback from others (Hattie & Timperley, 2007). Education researchers 
have accumulated substantial data concerning which kinds of feedback best enhance 
learning, which kinds people value, and how and when feedback is most effectively 
delivered (e.g., Gielen, Peeters, Dochy, Onghena, & Struyven, 2010; Winstone, Nash, 
Rowntree, & Menezes, 2016; Wollenschläger, Hattie, Machts, Möller, & Harms, 
2016). But if any variety of feedback is to be truly effective, then the person who 
receives the feedback must be able draw upon it at a later time, when a need arises to 
develop an action plan or to directly implement the advice. In many cases this means 
it is highly advantageous to remember feedback; not least because many university 
students say they rarely read their written feedback more than once (Winstone, Nash, 
Rowntree, & Parker, 2017). For instance, imagine a student who receives critical 
feedback from her professor about her assignment. Ideally, the feedback should 
enable the student to improve her next assignment; however, if she never encodes the 
feedback in memory or is unable to recall it, then she may fail to reap those benefits.  
Memory processes are therefore strongly implicated in determining whether 
feedback is effective. But what kinds of feedback stick in memory? In this paper we 
ask whether simple variations in the wording of written feedback—designed to orient 
people either toward past performance or toward future improvement—could 
influence the likelihood that people will remember it. 
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A cognitive perspective on receiving feedback 
To begin asking how well people remember feedback, we can look to the 
research literature on memory as applied specifically to education. In that literature, 
cognitive psychologists have made sizeable contributions to our understanding of how 
students learn in general. For example, cumulative studies have neatly specified the 
mechanisms that underpin effective study practices, have examined how teaching 
environments and methods can be optimized to enhance learning, and have 
convincingly challenged educational myths (e.g., Agarwal, 2012; Chandler & 
Sweller, 1991; Pashler, McDaniel, Rohrer, & Bjork, 2008; Weinstein, McDermott, & 
Roediger, 2010). Eminent psychologists such as Roediger (2013; Roediger & Pyc, 
2012) have called for greater translation of these research findings into teaching 
practices, arguing that better public awareness of educational science should lead to 
more effective, evidence-based teaching and learning practices. 
Given the boom in memory research applied to education, and given the 
centrality of feedback to skill development, one might expect that cognitive 
psychologists would have amassed a wealth of research data on how effectively and 
under which circumstances people remember the feedback they receive on their 
performance. But in fact, very few such data currently exist. This is not to say that 
cognitive psychologists have ignored the topic of feedback; they certainly have not. 
However, most empirical studies on this topic to date have explored only very 
particular kinds of feedback. Specifically, many studies ask how receiving 
“correct/incorrect” feedback during or after a multiple-choice test can benefit 
students’ performance in a subsequent test (e.g., Butler, Karpicke, & Roediger, 2008; 
Butler & Roediger, 2008; Hays, Kornell, & Bjork, 2010; Kang, McDermott, & 
Roediger, 2007; Smith & Kimball, 2010). One interesting finding from many of these 
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studies is that even when people are explicitly told “You answered this question 
incorrectly; the correct answer is [XXXX],” often those people still fail to answer the 
same question correctly when asked again, even just a few minutes later. Quite 
understandably, people do not reliably remember all of the feedback they receive.  
In educational assessments, people typically receive feedback that goes far 
beyond being told whether they were correct or incorrect. Rather, people much more 
commonly receive detailed, descriptive feedback, with nuanced information about 
what was done well or less well. At present, the cognitive psychology literature tells 
us surprisingly little about how well and how accurately people remember these 
descriptive kinds of feedback. In fact, to our knowledge virtually no peer-reviewed 
research yet exists that examines people’s memory for descriptive feedback about 
their performance (see Cutumisu & Schwartz, in press, for one exception with a 
sample of middle school students). Empirical research on this issue would clearly be 
valuable, especially when we consider that the educational literature on learners’ 
engagement with feedback is notably lacking in experimental data (Winstone, Nash, 
Parker, & Rowntree, 2017). Might some kinds of feedback be better or more 
accurately remembered than others? Distinguishing two particular kinds of feedback 
offers a useful foundation for considering this question. 
Evaluative vs. directive feedback 
An issue often discussed in the education literature is whether learners gain 
most from receiving past-oriented evaluative feedback—focused on what the learner 
did well or badly—or from receiving future-oriented directive feedback, focused on 
how she or he could improve (sometimes called “feedforward”). Education experts 
often advise feedback-givers to focus on the future: the main purpose of feedback, 
after all, is to foster future improvement (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). In line with this 
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reasoning, thinking about one’s own future can encourage people to take decisions 
and actions that are of distal rather than only proximal benefit (see Prabhakar, 
Coughlin, & Ghetti, 2016). Not only do many education experts perceive greater 
value in directive feedback, but students, too, typically prefer receiving feedback 
about improvement, rather than feedback about what they did well or badly in the past 
(Winstone et al., 2016). But cognitive psychological research gives us reason to 
predict that these preferences for directive feedback would be supplemented by 
cognitive benefits. Specifically, the future-orientation of directive feedback could 
mean that learners are more likely to subsequently remember it, as compared with 
evaluative feedback. 
Remembering for the future 
It is now commonly accepted among researchers that memory evolved not 
only as a faculty for documenting the past, but also for enabling people to anticipate 
and plan for the future (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Klein, 2013; Pillemer, 2003). 
Because remembering serves this evolutionarily adaptive, directive function, an 
implication is that memory systems and processes should in principle be especially 
well attuned to remembering information that concerns the future, as compared to 
information that concerns the past (Bluck, 2003; Klein, 2013; Pillemer, Picariello, 
Law, & Reichman, 1999).  
Indeed, there is some evidence to support this view. In one study, Klein, 
Robertson, and Delton (2010) asked subjects to learn a list of object words. Whilst 
encoding the words, some subjects were asked to form a mental picture of a campsite, 
and to rate the likelihood that each object would appear at the campsite. Other 
subjects learned the same words, but were asked to remember a specific time in the 
past when they went camping, and to rate the likelihood that each object was at the 
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campsite during their trip. A third group, while learning the words, were asked to 
imagine planning a camping trip, and to rate the likelihood that they would take along 
each of the objects. Klein et al. found that the latter group, who planned for a future 
camping trip, subsequently recalled more of the words than did either of the other 
groups (see also Klein, Robertson, & Delton, 2011). These data point to memory 
benefits of being oriented toward the future, and on this basis we could predict that 
people would recall directive feedback better than evaluative feedback. Additional 
findings from the prospective memory literature might lead us to the same prediction. 
Research in that literature shows us that people develop more-accessible memory 
representations of instructions if they believe they will need to implement those 
instructions at a later time (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Koriat, Ben-Zur, & Nussbaum, 
1990). Insofar that directive feedback—unlike evaluative feedback—explicitly guides 
people on what to do in future, these findings might lead us again to predict that 
directive feedback would be better remembered. 
Overview of the present research 
The main aim of the present research was to directly test these predictions of a 
memory advantage for directive feedback over evaluative feedback. To this end, 
subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 completed a short writing assignment, and afterwards 
they received detailed—and ostensibly personalized—written feedback. This 
feedback was in fact generic, and included some comments written in an evaluative 
style and others in a directive style. In Experiments 3-6 we excluded the initial 
assignment, and subjects simply read the feedback as though it were written for 
another person. In all experiments, shortly after subjects read the feedback we gave 
them a surprise recall test, and we assessed which feedback comments they were able 
to reproduce. To preview our findings, in all six experiments we discovered the exact 
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opposite effect to the one we predicted: subjects recalled evaluative feedback 
substantially better than directive feedback. Our data provide initial tests of some 
possible theoretical explanations of this finding. 
Experiment 1 
The procedures for all the experiments reported in this paper were reviewed 
and approved by an institutional research ethics committee. 
Method 
Subjects. A total of 61 psychology undergraduates (57 females and 4 males, 
Mage = 20.24, SD = 5.00, Range = 18-45) took part in exchange either for £10 or for 
course credit. 
Materials. 
Feedback scripts. We developed two versions of a script of standardized 
feedback to give to subjects. These scripts totaled 418 words (version A) and 411 
words (version B) respectively, and can be found in the online supplemental 
materials. Both feedback scripts were divided into three subsections labeled 
“substance”, “style”, and “format,” and each subsection contained several pieces of 
critique that were prefixed and suffixed by brief praise. The praise was not relevant to 
our experimental design, but was included merely to make the feedback as a whole 
seem less severe and more realistic. 
Each feedback script contained 20 critique comments in total, and all subjects 
saw the same comments in the same order. The only difference between the two 
feedback scripts was the style in which each critique comment was written. 
Specifically, in both scripts half of the critique comments were written in an 
evaluative style; that is, they were presented as comments about the essays that the 
subject had produced, and thus they focused on past performance. The other half of 
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the critique comments were written in a directive style; that is, they were presented as 
comments about what the subject could improve next time, and thus they focused on 
future performance. We achieved this style manipulation using minimal re-wording of 
each critique comment, to cast the same general meaning in both an evaluative and a 
directive manner whilst keeping the comments’ length and complexity approximately 
equal. For example, half of subjects were told “You didn’t always demonstrate a 
sophisticated awareness of the issues you covered” (an evaluative comment), whereas 
the other half were told “You should aim to demonstrate a more sophisticated 
awareness of the issues you cover” (a directive comment). In both feedback scripts, 
critique comments were presented in pairs that alternated between the evaluative and 
directive style. We counterbalanced between scripts whether each individual critique 
comment appeared in the evaluative or directive style. 
Achievement Goal Questionnaire—Revised (AGQ-R). All participants 
completed the AGQ-R, a widely-used and validated measure of trait achievement 
goals (Elliot & Murayama, 2008). The AGQ-R comprises 12 items that subjects rate 
on scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The measure distinguishes 
mastery goals (developing competence relative to an absolute or intrapersonal 
standard) from performance goals (developing competence relative to a normative 
standard), and distinguishes approach goals (focusing on success) from avoidance 
goals (focusing on preventing failure). Four subscales of the AGQ-R, each calculated 
from 3 of the 12 scale-items, index each of the achievement goal-types in this 2 
(mastery vs. performance) x 2 (approach vs. avoidance) framework. For example, one 
item from the mastery-approach subscale is “My goal is to learn as much as possible.” 
Procedure. Subjects signed up for a study purportedly investigating 
“personality and persuasive writing.” Each subject individually attended two sessions 
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in the laboratory, separated by 1-2 days according to their availability. All instructions 
and information were presented to subjects on a computer screen.  
Session 1. In the first session, subjects learned that they would be completing 
a persuasive writing task. To begin, we gave subjects a list of ten “contentious 
topics,” and from these we asked them to choose four on which to write short essays. 
For example, two of the topics were “Should students have to pay for their university 
education?” and “Should Valentine’s Day be abolished?”. After selecting their topics, 
one of the chosen essay titles appeared at random on the computer screen, and we 
asked subjects to type a short persuasive essay on that topic, with a time limit of 5 
min. A countdown timer at the top of the page indicated how much time was 
remaining. After 5 min, the page automatically changed, and the second essay title 
appeared. This process was repeated for all four essay titles, with a total duration of 
20 min.  
After finishing their fourth essay, subjects completed the AGQ-R. We then 
verbally informed subjects that a member of the teaching team would examine their 
persuasive essays prior to the second session, and would produce some detailed 
feedback on their performance. We told subjects that they would be given this 
feedback in Session 2, and we falsely informed subjects that after reading this 
feedback they would complete more persuasive writing. 
Session 2. When subjects returned for the second session 1-2 days later, we 
presented to them, at random, one of our two feedback scripts on the computer screen. 
Despite all subjects receiving the same feedback comments, we told them that the 
feedback had been prepared specifically for themselves, based on their own 
persuasive writing in session 1. Subjects were allowed as much time as they needed to 
read their feedback script, and they clicked a button once they wished to proceed. 
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Next they completed a 5-min filler task, which involved solving reasoning puzzles 
similar to Raven’s progressive matrices. When the time was up, subjects were 
automatically moved on. 
On the next page, we gave subjects a surprise recall test. We asked them to 
think back to the feedback they received, and we gave them up to 10 min to type as 
much of the feedback as they could recall. We told them that although they probably 
would not remember the feedback verbatim, they should nevertheless try to be as 
accurate as possible with regard to the meaning of what had been written. Subjects 
were unable to move on to the next part of the experiment until they had spent at least 
5 min on this recall task, but they were automatically moved on after 10 min.  
Following this task, subjects used rating scales to judge the fairness (1 = Very 
unfair; 5 = Very fair) and helpfulness (1 = Very unhelpful; 5 = Very helpful) of the 
feedback. They also judged what percentage grade they would give themselves for 
their writing in session 1, and what grade they believed they could achieve next time 
in light of the feedback they received. We then asked them to write down any 
comments they had about the feedback.  
To gain additional memory data, we next gave subjects a two-alternative 
forced choice (2AFC) recognition test, which included 10 questions. For each 
question, subjects saw one of the pairs of feedback comments written in an evaluative 
style, alongside the equivalent pair written in a directive style. We counterbalanced 
the presentation order. Subjects attempted to identify which of the pairs they had 
actually seen in their own feedback. After completing the recognition test, we finally 
asked subjects to write down what they believed the aim of the experiment was, and 
we debriefed and compensated them.  
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Data coding. A research assistant examined each subject’s free recall 
response, blind both to our experimental hypotheses, and to which of the two 
feedback scripts each subject saw. Based on the gist of the responses, she then coded 
(a) which of the critique comments the subject had recalled, and (b) in which style 
(i.e., evaluative vs. directive) she or he had reproduced each comment. The coder 
ignored any praise that subjects recalled, and if a subject recalled a particular 
comment in both an evaluative and a directive style (for example, in two separate 
parts of their written response), this was coded twice. The first author, also blind to 
which version of the feedback each subject had received, independently coded 20% of 
responses in the same manner.  
Our coding also permitted us to explore a secondary question: did subjects 
tend to recall the feedback in the same style as they had actually seen it, or did they 
systematically misremember comments in the incorrect style? This is an interesting 
question because systematic biases in how people reproduce the feedback from 
memory could provide insight into their spontaneous thought when reading the 
feedback (e.g., Brewer, 1977; Chan & McDermott, 2006; Garry, Strange, Bernstein, 
& Kinzett, 2007; Klepacz, Nash, Egan, Hodgkins, & Raats, 2016). For instance, if 
people systematically misremember evaluative comments in a directive style, this 
could suggest that they are spontaneously inferring what they would need to do 
differently next time. To answer this secondary question, after the initial coding we 
unblinded the data to reveal which of the feedback scripts the subject actually saw. 
Doing this enabled us to assess (separately for each coder’s judgments) whether each 
of the recalled comments had been reproduced in the same style as it was actually 
presented (i.e., evaluative comments recalled as evaluative; directive comments 
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recalled as directive), or in the alternate, incorrect style (i.e., evaluative comments 
recalled as directive; directive comments recalled as evaluative).  
The two coders’ agreement was strong in terms of the total number of 
evaluative comments recalled in an evaluative style (r = .89); the number of directive 
comments recalled in a directive style (r = .79); the number of evaluative comments 
recalled in a directive style (r = .86); and the number of directive comments recalled 
in an evaluative style (r = .92). The analyses below are therefore based on the first 
coder’s data.  
Results 
Subjects’ appraisals of the feedback. Before addressing our main research 
questions, we first asked whether subjects seemed to believe our cover story that the 
feedback was personalized. Our data suggest that they did. Overall, when we asked 
subjects to write down any comments they had about the feedback, none indicated 
suspicion that the feedback was generic rather than personalized. Instead, many of the 
comments indicated that subjects were convinced by the feedback, and were even 
prepared to take it on board – a kind of “Barnum effect” (Johnson, Cain, Falke, 
Hayman, & Perillo, 1985). For example, one subject wrote “This feedback was useful 
and would be helpful for future work. It also makes me appreciate the process of 
reflection on my own work to improve.” Another wrote “It was generally fair and I 
agreed upon most of what was said.” In fact, subjects rated the feedback highly in 
terms of both fairness (M = 4.03 out of 5, SD = 0.77), and helpfulness (M = 4.11, SD 
= 0.49). They also believed that the feedback could help them to perform better next 
time. Specifically, although they believed they had performed poorly on the writing 
task, estimating their grade at just 49.93% (SD = 8.98%), they estimated that with the 
help of the feedback, they could achieve an average grade of 63.41% (SD = 8.14%) 
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next time. Finally, no subjects correctly guessed the aim of the study when asked, or 
guessed that the past vs. future orientation of the feedback was critical. Together, 
these data suggest that subjects truly believed they were receiving personalized 
feedback on their own writing. 
Free recall. Our main analysis had two principal aims. The first aim was to 
assess the extent to which the evaluative vs. directive style of feedback comments 
would influence subjects’ tendency to freely recall those comments. The second aim 
was to assess whether subjects systematically distorted this feedback style in their 
recollections. To answer these questions, we conducted a 2 (Feedback style: 
evaluative vs. directive) x 2 (Retrieval style accuracy: correct vs. incorrect) repeated-
measures ANOVA on the number of critique comments that subjects recalled. Note 
that the first of these independent variables relates to the style in which the feedback 
comments were actually presented to subjects. The second variable relates to whether 
subjects recalled the comments in the same style as they actually saw them, or in the 
alternate, incorrect style. 
As shown in Figure 1, our analysis revealed that contrary to our predictions, 
subjects recalled significantly more of the evaluative feedback than of the directive 
feedback, as indexed by a substantial main effect of feedback style, F(1, 60) = 16.82, 
p < .001, η2p = .22, d = 0.76, 95% CI on d [0.37, 1.14]. We also found that subjects 
had generally paid good attention to the wording and style of the feedback they 
received, as evidenced by a main effect of retrieval style accuracy whereby subjects 
recalled more feedback comments in the correct style than in the incorrect style, F(1, 
60) = 28.98, p < .001, η2p = .33, d = 1.02 [0.60, 1.43].  
		 15	
 
Figure 1. Recall of evaluative and directive feedback in Experiment 1, split according 
to retrieval style accuracy. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals 
(Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
 
Finally, we found that regardless of the style in which the feedback comments 
were actually presented, subjects reproduced feedback in an evaluative style more 
frequently than they reproduced feedback in a directive style. This result is indexed 
by a significant interaction effect, again with a large effect size, F(1, 60) = 22.51, p < 
.001, η2p = .27, d = 1.10 [0.61, 1.59]. Follow up paired t-tests showed that people 
reproduced evaluative comments in the correct, evaluative style significantly more 
often than they reproduced evaluative comments in the incorrect, directive style, t(60) 
= 6.32, p < .001, d = 1.40 [0.90, 1.90]. Specifically, of all evaluative comments that 
were recalled, 77% were recalled as evaluative, and 23% as directive. In contrast, 
people reproduced directive comments in the correct, directive style no more often 
than they reproduced directive comments in the incorrect, evaluative style, t(60) = 
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1.80, p = .08, d = -0.38 [-0.81, 0.04]. Specifically, of all directive comments that were 
recalled, 41% were recalled as directive, and 59% as evaluative. 
In short, our analysis points to what we might term an evaluative recall bias; 
that is, subjects were considerably more likely to recall feedback if it was presented in 
an evaluative rather than directive style, despite the substance of the feedback in both 
cases being virtually identical. Moreover, our data revealed that subjects tended to 
adopt an evaluative retrieval style; that is, they tended to reproduce the feedback 
comments in an evaluative style even when they had actually been directive. 
 Recognition performance. Subjects performed well overall in the 2AFC 
recognition test, identifying 70.98% (SD = 14.11%) of the comments correctly. In this 
test, subjects could make two possible types of recognition error: (1) recognizing 
evaluative feedback when in fact they had seen directive feedback (“evaluative 
errors”); or (2) recognizing directive feedback when in fact they had seen evaluative 
feedback (“directive errors”). A paired t-test revealed only a nonsignificant trend 
difference in how frequently each of these types of error was committed (Evaluative 
errors, M = 16.7%, SD = 13.0%; Directive errors, M = 12.3%, SD = 9.4%), t(60) = 
1.95, p = .06, d = 0.39, 95% CI on d [-0.01, 0.79]. 
Achievement goal orientation. We found no evidence that subjects’ recall 
bias, retrieval style, or total number of comments recalled, were meaningfully related 
to their achievement goal orientations as measured with the AGQ-R (see Table S1 in 
the online supplemental materials for full details). 
Experiment 2 
The data from students in Experiment 1 suggest a strong memory advantage 
for evaluative feedback relative to directive feedback. This evaluative recall bias is 
rather surprising given that the prior evidence described above led us to predict the 
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exact opposite bias, and even the education literature suggests that students would be 
more interested in directive feedback than in evaluative feedback. In fact, it is also at 
odds with our students’ own predictions. We defined evaluative and directive 
feedback to 36 psychology undergraduates who did not take part in these experiments, 
and asked them (a) which—all else being equal—they would prefer to receive 
(evaluative/directive), (b) which they would pay most attention to 
(evaluative/directive/both about the same), and (c) which they would be most likely to 
remember (evaluative/directive/both about the same). Overall, 72% said they would 
prefer to receive directive feedback (vs. 28% evaluative), 42% said they would pay 
more attention to directive feedback (vs. 17% evaluative), and 58% said they would 
be more likely to remember directive feedback (vs. 14% evaluative). 
The fact that the unexpected recall bias was large by conventional standards 
makes it all the more intriguing. Nevertheless, it is important to replicate unexpected 
findings before interpreting them with any confidence. In Experiment 2 we aimed to 
do so. Assuming that our findings could be replicated, it would be valuable to gain a 
sense of the robustness of this evaluative recall bias. One straightforward 
interpretation is that the bias simply reflects the kinds of feedback that subjects 
consciously expect will be most important for them to encode within the specific task. 
If this were true, then it should be easy to amplify or attenuate the effect simply by 
instructing subjects about the kinds of information they should prioritize when 
reading the feedback. In Experiment 2, then, as well as aiming to replicate the 
evaluative recall bias, we also manipulated the instructions we gave to subjects. 
Whereas some were told simply to read the feedback, a second group were told to 
focus on finding out how they had performed, and a third group were told to focus on 
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finding out how to improve in future. The effectiveness of this simple manipulation 
should offer initial insights into the mechanisms underlying the evaluative recall bias. 
Method 
Subjects. In this experiment we added a further experimental manipulation—
comprising three between-subjects conditions—to the within-subjects design used in 
Experiment 1. We conducted a power analysis to determine the sample size necessary 
to detect a medium-sized interaction effect (f = .25) in a 2 x 3 within-between subjects 
design, assuming power = .80, alpha = .05, and a correlation of zero between 
repeated-measures (approximated from the comparison of recalling evaluative vs. 
directive feedback in Experiment 1). This analysis suggested that 81 subjects would 
be required; we slightly oversampled and ultimately recruited 85 university students 
before coding or inspecting the data. Our final sample comprised 68 females and 17 
males (Mage = 20.10, SD = 1.92, Range = 18-28) who took part in exchange for either 
£10 or course credit. Most (59%) were studying psychology; the remainder were from 
a variety of other study disciplines.  
Materials and procedure. Subjects completed this experiment in two 
separate sessions, the first of which was the same as in Experiment 1 and involved 
producing short persuasive essays. The second session was also mostly identical, but 
at the start of this session we randomly assigned subjects to one of three conditions: 
Control, Past-orientation, or Future-orientation. Subjects in the control condition were 
simply told to read their feedback carefully, as per Experiment 1. However, subjects 
in the other two conditions received more specific instructions before reading their 
feedback. To those in the Past-orientation condition, we gave the following 
computerized instruction: 
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When students receive feedback, it is very important for them to 
use the feedback to understand how they performed. Researchers 
have shown that when reading feedback, good students look for 
information that evaluates their work, and for information that 
explains why the marker judged the piece of work at a particular 
standard. Various evidence shows that students who engage with 
their feedback in this way – using it to understand how they 
performed – tend to get better value out of it. With this information 
in mind, please read the feedback on the next page carefully. 
In contrast, we told subjects in the Future-orientation condition: 
When students receive feedback, it is very important for them to 
use the feedback to work out how to improve their performance. 
Researchers have shown that when reading feedback, good students 
look for information that directs them towards future improvement, 
and for information that explains where the marker thinks they 
should focus in order to improve the standard of their work. 
Various evidence shows that students who engage with their 
feedback in this way – using it to work out how to improve – tend 
to get better value out of it. With this information in mind, please 
read the feedback on the next page carefully. 
With only two other exceptions, the procedure was identical to session 2 of 
Experiment 1. The first exception was that in this experiment we covertly recorded 
(via the experiment software) how long subjects spent on the feedback page before 
clicking to continue. The second was that at the end of session 2, we showed subjects 
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the three task instructions from the Control, Past-orientation, and Future-orientation 
conditions respectively, in a random order, and we asked subjects which instruction 
they had seen. This final question served to check whether subjects had read the 
instructions properly. 
Data coding. We coded the data in the same way as in Experiment 1, with the 
second coder coding 20% of responses. The inter-rater agreement was high for the 
number of evaluative comments recalled in an evaluative style (r = .89); the number 
of directive comments recalled in a directive style (r = .79); the number of evaluative 
comments recalled in a directive style (r = .91); and the number of directive 
comments recalled in an evaluative style (r = .77). The analyses below are therefore 
based on the first coder’s data. 
Results 
Subjects’ appraisals of the feedback. Although five subjects noted in their 
written comments that the feedback seemed rather generic, many others wrote 
comments suggesting that they found the feedback useful, and none correctly guessed 
the aim of the study. As Table 1 shows, subjects again said that they found the 
feedback both fair and helpful, and believed it could help them to achieve a better 
grade next time. The fairness and helpfulness ratings did not differ significantly 
across instruction conditions (both p > .14, both η2p < .05). Likewise, our instruction 
manipulation did not significantly influence the grades subjects assigned themselves 
for their writing in session 1, F(2, 82) = 1.25, p = .29, η2p = .03. But it did affect their 
assessments of what grade they could achieve in the future, F(2, 82) = 3.56, p = .03, 
η2p = .08. Post-hoc Bonferroni tests showed that Future-orientation subjects projected 
higher future grades than did control subjects (p = .03); however, Past-orientation 
subjects’ projections did not differ significantly from either those of control (p = .28) 
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or Future-orientation (p = .93) subjects. We should note that of the 85 subjects, 26 
failed to correctly identify at the end of session 2 which instruction they had received 
at the start of that session. However, the pattern and statistical significance of all the 
findings described thus far were identical even when these 26 people were excluded 
from analyses.1 
 When we looked at the amount of time the full sample of subjects (i.e., N = 
85) spent actually reading the feedback (first log-transforming these durations to 
successfully correct for positive skew), the means did not differ significantly between 
the groups, F(2, 82) = 1.44, p = .24, η2p = .03. However, when we excluded the 26 
subjects who failed the attention check (i.e., restricting our analyses to those who 
remembered which instruction they received), a significant difference between 
conditions emerged, F(2, 56) = 6.09, p < .01, η2p = .18. Post-hoc Bonferroni tests 
showed that subjects in the control group spent significantly less time reading the 
feedback (M = 106 sec, SD = 36) than did those in both the Past-orientation (M = 132 
sec, SD = 45, p = .04) and Future-orientation conditions (M = 135 sec, SD = 25, p < 
.01). The latter conditions did not significantly differ (p = 1.00). 
 
Table 1. Experiment 2. Subjects’ appraisals of the feedback according to condition 
(SDs in parentheses; N = 85). 
 Condition 
 Control Past-
orientation 
Future-
orientation 
Total 
Fairness 4.23 (0.71) 4.00 (0.73) 4.14 (0.71) 4.12 (0.71) 
Helpfulness 4.12 (0.52) 4.19 (0.65) 4.43 (0.63) 4.25 (0.62) 
Session 1 self-
assessment (%) 
48.42 (13.40) 51.35 (11.76) 53.32 (8.71) 51.11 (11.45) 
Projected grade 
(%) 
60.00 (11.84) 64.52 (9.08) 67.18 (8.93) 64.01 (10.26) 
																																																								
1 In the full sample (N = 85), ncontrol = 26; npast = 31; nfuture = 28. Of those 26 who 
failed to identify the correct instruction, ncontrol = 4; npast = 14; nfuture = 8. 
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Free recall. Our recall and recognition analyses reached identical conclusions 
whether or not we included the 26 subjects who failed the attention check, therefore 
we report the full-sample analyses here. To explore which parts of their feedback 
subjects recalled, we conducted a 3 (Instruction: Control vs. Past-orientation vs. 
Future-orientation) x 2 (Feedback style: evaluative vs. directive) x 2 (Retrieval style 
accuracy: correct vs. incorrect) mixed-measures ANOVA on the number of feedback 
comments recalled. As shown in Figure 2, we once again found an evaluative recall 
bias: subjects recalled significantly more of the evaluative feedback comments than of 
the directive feedback comments, F(1, 82) = 40.21, p < .001, η2p = .33, d = 0.83 [0.54, 
1.11]. They also recalled more feedback in the correct style than in the incorrect style, 
F(1, 82) = 31.34, p < .001, η2p = .28, d = 0.79 [0.48, 1.09].  
 
 
Figure 2. Recall of evaluative and directive feedback in Experiment 2, split according 
to retrieval style accuracy and instruction condition. Error bars are 95% within-
subject confidence intervals, calculated separately for each instruction condition 
(Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
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A significant two-way interaction confirmed that subjects again adopted an 
evaluative retrieval style: that is, they reproduced feedback in an evaluative style—
regardless of how comments had actually been framed—more frequently than they 
reproduced feedback in a directive style, F(1, 82) = 15.31, p < .001, η2p = .16, d = 
0.73 [0.35, 1.11]. Follow up paired t-tests showed that people reproduced evaluative 
comments in the correct, evaluative style significantly more often than they 
reproduced evaluative comments in the incorrect, directive style, t(84) = 5.57, p < 
.001, d = 1.02 [0.63, 1.41]. Specifically, of all evaluative comments that were 
recalled, 70% were recalled as evaluative, and 30% as directive. However, people 
reproduced directive comments in the correct, directive style approximately as often 
as they reproduced directive comments in the incorrect, evaluative style, t(84) = 0.97, 
p = .34, d = 0.17 [-0.18, 0.53]. Specifically, of all directive comments that were 
recalled, 46% were recalled as directive, and 54% as evaluative. 
Neither of the two-way interactions involving the instruction variable, nor the 
three-way interaction, was significant (all ps > .16, all η2p < .05). However, there was 
a significant overall main effect of instruction, F(2, 82) = 4.87, p = .01, η2p = .11. 
Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons showed that subjects in the Future-orientation 
condition recalled more feedback overall compared with those in the Control 
condition (p < .01). However, overall recall in the Past-orientation condition did not 
differ significantly from either the Control condition (p = .12) or Future-orientation 
condition (p = .83). In other words, even though our instruction manipulation did not 
shift the evaluative recall bias, simply telling subjects to look for clues on how to 
improve in future nevertheless led them to subsequently recall more feedback overall. 
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 Recognition performance. Subjects’ recognition data are illustrated in Table 
2. We conducted a 3 (Instruction) x 2 (Error type: Evaluative errors vs. Directive 
errors) mixed-factor ANOVA on the number of recognition errors made; this analysis 
revealed no significant main effect of instruction, F(2, 82) = 0.65, p = .53, η2p = .02, 
nor of error type, F(1, 82) = 0.36, p = .55, η2p < .01, d = 0.11 [-0.24, 0.47], nor a 
significant two-way interaction of these factors, F(2, 82) = 0.05, p = .95, η2p < .01.  
 
Table 2. Subjects’ recognition test performance in Experiment 2, according to 
instruction condition (SDs in parentheses; N = 85). 
 Instruction 
 Control Past-
orientation 
Future-
orientation 
Total 
Evaluative 
errors (%) 
13.85 (11.34) 12.58 (9.99) 14.64 (12.32) 13.65 (11.11) 
Directive errors 
(%) 
14.23 (11.72) 14.52 (10.28) 16.07 (12.86) 14.94 (11.51) 
Accurate 
recognition (%) 
71.54 (15.67) 72.90 (11.31) 69.29 (11.52) 71.29 (12.80) 
 
Achievement goal orientation. There was little evidence that subjects’ recall 
bias, retrieval style, or total number of comments recalled, were meaningfully related 
to their achievement goal orientations (see Table S2 in the online supplemental 
materials for details). 
Experiment 3 
 The results of Experiment 2 show that the evaluative recall bias can be 
replicated, and was relatively unaffected by an explicit instruction to prioritize 
directive (or evaluative) information. The latter finding gives us reason to believe that 
the bias is not a product of subjects assuming that evaluative information would be 
more important to encode.  
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So how might we explain this bias? One possibility is that subjects did not 
particularly care about improving their persuasive writing skills, and so were not 
motivated to care about the directive feedback. This explanation does not wholly fit 
with the spontaneous comments made by many subjects in Experiments 1 and 2; 
nevertheless it warrants some scrutiny. The explanation hinges on the assumption that 
whereas subjects cared little about improving (i.e., the directive feedback), they did 
care how they performed (i.e., the evaluative feedback). If this explanation were 
correct, then we should not observe the recall bias in a situation where the feedback is 
overtly irrelevant to the subjects themselves and to anything they have done. In this 
context, subjects should be no more motivated to read evaluative comments than to 
read directive comments.  
Several other plausible accounts of the evaluative recall bias similarly assume 
that the effect would disappear when people read and recall feedback that is irrelevant 
to themselves. For example, a distinguishing feature of the evaluative feedback in 
Experiments 1 and 2 is that it was ostensibly related to essays that the subject already 
wrote, and that they could therefore visualize and remember producing, whereas the 
directive feedback only related to hypothetical future essays. Another account of the 
bias, then, is that evaluative feedback is more concrete, which could make those 
comments easier to encode and/or retrieve from memory than is directive feedback. A 
third account is that evaluative feedback is perceived as more self-relevant than is 
directive feedback, insofar as it relates to the subject’s current self, rather than to a 
possible future self, and so is more easily or effectively encoded. Finally, a fourth 
account is that because directive feedback implies an obligation to act upon the 
advice, whereas evaluative feedback does not, the former might provoke an 
“information avoidance” response. This response, observed in many domains of 
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applied psychology, is characterized by an unwillingness to receive information that 
might require difficult actions to be taken (e.g., Howell & Shepperd, 2013; Sweeny, 
Melnyk, Miller, & Shepperd, 2010). If people selectively avoid feedback that obliges 
them to work hard to improve, then this would explain why directive feedback is 
poorly recalled. 
Like the motivational account described above, if any of the concreteness, 
self-relevance, or information avoidance accounts is correct, then the evaluative recall 
bias should only occur when subjects receive feedback about their own prior 
performance, not when the feedback is irrelevant to themselves. In Experiment 3, we 
tested the plausibility of these four accounts by removing the persuasive writing task 
from our procedure entirely, and simply showing subjects—and asking them to 
recall—the feedback scripts that we used in our earlier experiments. In these 
circumstances, both evaluative and directive feedback should be equally motivating, 
concrete, and self-relevant, and neither should evoke information avoidance. If the 
evaluative recall bias disappeared in these circumstances, then the next step would be 
to determine which of the mechanisms had played a role.  
Method 
Subjects. A total of 40 volunteers (30 females and 10 males, Mage = 28.23, SD 
= 12.02, Range = 18-71) responded to an online advertisement, and took part without 
compensation. 
Materials and procedure. We invited subjects to complete an online study on 
how people judge assessment feedback. To start, we informed subjects they would see 
some written feedback that another student had supposedly received after completing 
a set of short essays. We asked subjects to imagine the person receiving this feedback, 
and to read it carefully. 
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The remainder of the procedure was identical to the second session in 
Experiment 1, except that we shortened the filler task to 3 min, and subjects did not 
rate the fairness or helpfulness of the feedback, estimate grades, or complete a 
recognition task.  
Data coding. We coded the data in the same way as in Experiments 1 and 2, 
but this time due to the smaller sample, the second coder coded 100% of responses. 
The inter-rater agreement was very high: number of evaluative comments recalled in 
an evaluative style (r = .95); the number of directive comments recalled in a directive 
style (r = .93); the number of evaluative comments recalled in a directive style (r = 
.93); and the number of directive comments recalled in an evaluative style (r = .96). 
The analyses below are therefore based on the first coder’s data. 
Results 
The aim of this study was to find out whether subjects would still 
preferentially recall evaluative feedback over directive feedback, even when those 
feedback comments were not related to the subjects’ concrete personal experiences. 
To answer this question, we conducted a 2 (Feedback style: evaluative vs. directive) x 
2 (Retrieval style accuracy: correct vs. incorrect) repeated-measures ANOVA on the 
number of feedback comments recalled. Figure 3 shows that the results were highly 
similar to those of the previous experiments. Specifically, subjects once again recalled 
significantly more of the evaluative feedback than of the directive feedback, F(1, 39) 
= 6.65, p = .01, η2p = .15, d = 0.54, 95% CI on d [0.11, 0.97]. There was also a 
significant main effect of retrieval style accuracy, whereby subjects recalled more 
feedback comments in the correct style than in the incorrect style, F(1, 39) = 18.61, p 
< .001, η2p = .32, d = 0.99 [0.48, 1.48]. 
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Figure 3. Recall of evaluative and directive feedback in Experiment 3, split according 
to retrieval style accuracy. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals 
(Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
 
Finally, a significant interaction effect confirmed that subjects tended to 
reproduce feedback in an evaluative style—regardless of how comments were 
actually presented— more frequently than they reproduced feedback in a directive 
style, F(1, 39) = 18.87, p < .001, η2p = .33, d = 1.13 [0.56, 1.70]. Follow up paired t-
tests showed that people reproduced evaluative comments in the correct, evaluative 
style significantly more often than they reproduced evaluative comments in the 
incorrect, directive style, t(39) = 5.62, p < .001, d = 1.25 [0.68, 1.80]. Specifically, of 
all evaluative comments that were recalled, 84% were recalled as evaluative, and 16% 
as directive. However, people reproduced directive comments in the correct, directive 
style no more often than they reproduced directive comments in the incorrect, 
evaluative style, t(39) = 1.10, p = .28, d = -0.48 [-1.00, 0.05]. Specifically, of all 
directive comments that were recalled, 42% were recalled as directive, and 58% as 
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evaluative. Overall then, we wholly replicated the main findings of Experiment 1 
despite these subjects only reading feedback that apparently belonged to another 
person. 
Experiment 4 
Based on the results of Experiment 3, the evaluative recall bias cannot easily 
be attributed to subjects being primarily focused on how well they performed, and 
disinterested in future improvement. Nor are those results consistent with the 
interpretations that evaluative feedback is more concrete or self-relevant to subjects, 
or less likely to invoke information avoidance. If any of these four accounts were 
correct, then the evaluative recall bias should have disappeared in Experiment 3, and 
yet this was not the case. To validate this finding, in Experiment 4 we aimed to 
replicate the general method of Experiment 3.  
We also set out to address a second question in Experiment 4: would the 
evaluative recall bias survive in a fully between-subjects design, where each subject 
sees either evaluative feedback only, or directive feedback only (as contrasted with 
the within-subjects design used in all experiments thus far, where all subjects saw 
both types of feedback)? Answering this question has practical relevance, given that 
feedback is undoubtedly delivered in many different formats in the real-world, rather 
than always with evaluative and directive advice interleaved. But this question is also 
theoretically relevant. For instance, another plausible explanation of the evaluative 
recall bias is that evaluative comments preferentially capture attention, perhaps 
because these comments can feel destructive where directive feedback feels 
constructive (Fong et al., 2016). Studies from many areas of psychological science 
show us that stimuli conveying threat can automatically attract attention, even when 
the observers themselves (i.e., the subjects) are not personally threatened (Öhman & 
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Mineka, 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). If this attention capture account were 
correct, then we should predict the evaluative recall bias to disappear in a between-
subjects design, where in principle no feedback comments should systematically draw 
attention away from others.  
Method 
Subjects. A total of 165 students from a large further education college in the 
West Midlands of England took part during class, without compensation. This sample 
size was based solely on the number of students available on one day of testing. In 
total, 13 subjects were removed from analyses because they failed to follow task 
instructions (e.g., reported that they had not read the feedback). All analyses are thus 
based on the remaining 152 subjects (112 females, 39 males, 1 other; Mage = 16.92, 
SD = 0.39, Range = 16-19). Each subject was randomly assigned to either the Mixed 
feedback condition (n = 50), the Evaluative-only feedback condition (n = 51), or the 
Directive-only feedback condition (n = 51). 
Materials and procedure. Subjects followed the same general procedure as 
in Experiment 3, with two amendments. First, subjects in the Evaluative-only 
feedback condition saw a feedback script combining all the evaluative critique 
comments from both of the scripts used in Experiments 1-3, without any directive 
comments. Likewise, subjects in the Directive-only feedback condition saw a script 
containing all the directive critique comments, with no evaluative comments. Subjects 
in the Mixed feedback condition saw, at random, one of the two scripts used in 
Experiments 1-3, in which evaluative and directive comments were interleaved. In all 
conditions the same praise comments appeared at the start and end of each paragraph.  
The second amendment from Experiment 3 was that after completing the 
recall task, all subjects made a series of additional judgments similar to those 
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collected in Experiments 1-2. Specifically, they rated (1) how helpful the feedback 
would be to the person who received it, (2) what percentage grade they think the 
person received, and (3) what grade the person might get on a subsequent task if they 
took the feedback on board. We also covertly measured the amount of time subjects 
spent on the feedback page before moving on. Mirroring the forced-choice questions 
used in our informal survey, mentioned in the introduction to Experiment 2, we asked 
subjects which kinds of comments they prefer to receive on their work (evaluative vs. 
directive), which they would pay most attention to (evaluative/directive/both about 
the same), and which they would be most likely to remember 
(evaluative/directive/both about the same).  
Data coding. Subjects’ recall data were coded following the same procedures 
as in the earlier experiments, and a second coder blind-coded 20% of responses. The 
inter-rater agreement was very high: number of evaluative comments recalled in an 
evaluative style (r = .95); the number of directive comments recalled in a directive 
style (r = .85); the number of evaluative comments recalled in a directive style (r = 
.90); and the number of directive comments recalled in an evaluative style (r = .88). 
Analyses are therefore based on the first coder’s data. 
Results 
Subjects’ appraisals of the feedback. As Table 3 shows, there were no 
meaningful differences between conditions in terms of the perceived helpfulness of 
the feedback, what grade the fictional student might achieve next time, or in terms of 
the time spent reading the feedback (all p > .13, all η2p < .03; distributions of reading 
times were already reasonably normal and so they were not log-transformed). 
However, there were significant differences in subjects’ estimates of the grade the 
fictional student had achieved, F(2, 149) = 4.08, p = .02, η2p = .05. Post-hoc 
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Bonferroni tests showed that Directive-only subjects estimated higher grades than did 
Evaluative-only subjects (p = .01); however, neither group’s estimates differed 
significantly from those of Mixed feedback subjects (both p > .46). In other words, 
when subjects only read directive critique, they believed the writer had performed 
better than when they read only evaluative critique. This finding may provide further 
insights into the underlying cause of the evaluative recall bias, and we return to this 
point shortly in an analysis of our study materials. 	
Table 3. Experiment 4. Subjects’ appraisals of the feedback according to condition 
(SDs in parentheses; N = 152). 
 Condition 
 Mixed Evaluative-
only 
Directive-
only 
Total 
Helpfulness 3.64 (0.85) 3.69 (1.12) 3.80 (0.98) 3.71 (0.99) 
Estimate of fictional 
student’s grade (%) 
62.92 (12.24) 59.63 (13.24) 66.25 (9.35) 62.93 (11.96) 
Fictional student’s 
projected grade (%) 
75.06 (12.19) 75.73 (15.50) 79.88 (11.33) 76.90 (13.22) 
Time spent reading 
feedback (sec) 
114.9 (37.8) 116.3 (37.4) 114.7 (44.56) 115.3 (39.8) 
 
Across the full sample, 76% of subjects said they would prefer to receive 
directive feedback (vs. 24% preferring evaluative). Whereas 41% believed they would 
pay more attention to directive feedback, only 13% believed they would pay more 
attention to evaluative feedback. And whereas 51% believed they would remember 
directive feedback better, only 30% believed they would remember evaluative 
feedback better. There were no significant differences across conditions (all χ2 (4) < 
4.4, all p > .36).  
Free recall. We began our main analyses by examining the data from the 
Mixed feedback condition alone. As the leftmost part of Figure 4 shows, this analysis 
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wholly replicated our previous findings. Specifically, a 2 (Feedback style: evaluative 
vs. directive) x 2 (Retrieval style accuracy: correct vs. incorrect) repeated-measures 
ANOVA showed that subjects recalled significantly more of the evaluative feedback 
than of the directive feedback, F(1, 49) = 13.80, p < .001, η2p = .22, d = 0.68, 95% CI 
on d [0.29, 1.06]. There was also a significant main effect of retrieval style accuracy, 
whereby subjects recalled more feedback comments in the correct style than in the 
incorrect style, F(1, 49) = 45.51, p < .001, η2p = .48, d = 1.27 [0.82, 1.71].  
A significant interaction effect showed that subjects reproduced feedback in 
an evaluative style more frequently than they reproduced feedback in a directive style, 
F(1, 49) = 30.24, p < .001, η2p = .38, d = 1.11 [0.65, 1.56]. Follow up paired t-tests 
showed that subjects reproduced evaluative comments in the correct, evaluative style 
significantly more often than they reproduced evaluative comments in the incorrect, 
directive style, t(49) = 8.27, p < .001, d = 1.59 [1.09, 2.07]. Of all evaluative 
comments that were recalled, 85% were recalled as evaluative, and 15% as directive. 
However, subjects reproduced directive comments in the correct, directive style and 
in the incorrect, evaluative style approximately equally, t(49) = 0.31, p = .76, d = 0.07 
[-0.36, 0.49]. Of all directive comments that were recalled, 52% were recalled as 
directive, and 48% as evaluative. In short, the data from the Mixed feedback 
condition fully replicate the findings of Experiment 3. 
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Figure 4. Recall of evaluative and directive feedback in Experiment 4, split according 
to retrieval style accuracy and feedback condition. Error bars for the Mixed condition 
are 95% within-subject confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994). Error bars for 
the Evaluative-only and Directive-only conditions are 95% between-subjects 
confidence intervals calculated separately for correct and for incorrect retrieval styles. 
 
Looking next at the two between-subject conditions, we conducted a 2 
(Feedback style: evaluative vs. directive) x 2 (Retrieval style accuracy: correct vs. 
incorrect) mixed-measures ANOVA on the number of feedback comments recalled, 
with the first factor manipulated between-subjects and the second manipulated within-
subjects. As the rightmost parts of Figure 4 show, Evaluative-only subjects recalled 
significantly more feedback than did Directive-only subjects, F(1, 100) = 4.26, p = 
.04, η2p = .04, d = 0.41, 95% CI on d [0.02, 0.80]. In other words, we replicated the 
evaluative recall bias even in a between-subjects design; a finding that does not fit 
neatly with the notion that evaluative feedback captures attention relatively more than 
does directive feedback.  
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There was also a significant main effect of retrieval style accuracy, with 
subjects recalling more feedback comments in the correct style than in the incorrect 
style, F(1, 100) = 34.54, p < .001, η2p = .26, d = 0.93 [0.59, 1.27]. However, this time 
there was no significant interaction effect, F(1, 100) = 1.27, p = .26, η2p = .01, d = 
0.22 [-0.17, 0.61], showing that Evaluative-only and Directive-only subjects were 
similarly accurate in their retrieval styles. 
Experiments 1-4 materials analyses 
 The results across Experiments 1-4 are remarkably consistent. However, we 
used the same feedback materials in all four of these experiments, and by looking 
more closely at these materials, we can address some further accounts of our findings. 
Specifically, here we tackled three issues that might have contributed to the observed 
effects.  
Item analysis of recall data 
The first issue that needs to be addressed is that despite our efforts to ensure 
the evaluative and directive comments in our materials were closely matched, the 
evaluative recall bias might be driven by one or two particularly memorable 
evaluative comments within these scripts. We tested this explanation by conducting 
an item analysis, combining the data across all four experiments, and assessing how 
frequently each individual feedback comment was recalled when it was presented in 
an evaluative style versus a directive style. In this analysis we ignored the style in 
which subjects actually reproduced each comment.  
Results. Our analysis revealed that of the 20 critical feedback comments 
presented to all subjects, 17 were recalled directionally more often when presented in 
the evaluative rather than the directive retrieval style (see Table S3 in the online 
supplemental materials). For example, of those subjects who were told “there was not 
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always a clear sense of where your points were leading” (an evaluative comment), 
25% reproduced the gist of this comment in one style or the other. In contrast, of 
those subjects who were told “make sure there is always a clear sense of where your 
points are leading” (a directive comment), only 8% reproduced the gist of this 
comment. Our item analysis highlights concrete examples of how very subtle changes 
in wording led to sizeable effects on memory, and provides no evidence that our 
findings were driven by item-specific effects. 
Ratings of individual feedback comments 
The second issue to address, as illuminated in Experiment 4 (where subjects 
estimated higher percentage grades in the Directive-only condition than in the 
Evaluative-only condition), is that the evaluative and directive feedback may have 
differed not only in past vs. future orientation, but also in their perceived negativity or 
harshness. Confirming whether this is true may be important for identifying the cause 
of the apparent evaluative recall bias. The third issue is that people may infer that the 
intended meaning of feedback is evaluative, even when it is presented in a directive 
style. This inferred intention may be one possible explanation for the evaluative 
retrieval style that we have observed. To address both of these issues, we asked 
volunteers to individually appraise each of our feedback comments in terms of their 
harshness, their ‘evaluativeness’, and their ‘directiveness’. 
Subjects and procedure.  A total of 40 volunteers (33 females, 7 males; Mage 
= 30.10, SD = 10.35, Range = 19-63) took part online in exchange for a £5 voucher. 
Each was shown all 40 of the feedback comments used in Experiments 1-4, in a 
random sequential order. For each comment, subjects were given the stem “If I 
received this feedback comment, I would think it is…”, followed by three stem 
completions with 7-point response scales (1 = Not at all; 7 = Very much). These 
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involved judging whether each comment was (1) Worded negatively or harshly 
(hereafter, ‘harshness’); (2) ‘About’ the quality of my work (hereafter, 
‘evaluativeness’); and (3) ‘About’ how I could improve next time (hereafter, 
‘directiveness’). The harshness scale served to test the prediction that evaluative 
feedback would be judged as more harsh than directive feedback. The evaluativeness 
and directiveness scales served to test the notion that people infer an evaluative 
intention to feedback comments, regardless of written style. We predicted that if this 
notion were true, evaluative comments would be seen to have a weak directive 
function, whereas directive comments would be seen to have a strong evaluative 
function. 
Results. Analysis of subjects’ harshness ratings revealed that evaluative 
feedback comments were indeed judged as significantly more harsh or negative (M = 
2.29) than were directive comments (M = 1.76), t(39) = 8.46, p < .001, d = 0.78, 95% 
CI on d [0.53, 1.03]. We therefore return to explore this perceived harshness 
mechanism directly in Experiment 5. 
Looking at evaluativeness and directiveness ratings, there was a significant 
interaction of feedback type and rating type, F(1, 39) = 62.16, p < .001. As we should 
expect, evaluative comments were judged to have more of an evaluative function (M 
= 5.46) than a directive function (M = 3.97), t(39) = 5.98, p < .001, d = 1.22 [0.73, 
1.70] whereas directive comments were judged to have more of a directive function 
(M = 5.68) than an evaluative function (M = 4.85), t(39) = 4.95, p < .001, d = 0.79 
[0.43, 1.15]. However, in line with our specific prediction, subjects judged the 
evaluative function of directive comments to be significantly greater than the directive 
function of evaluative comments, t(39) = 4.08, p < .001, d = 0.74 [0.34, 1.13]. In other 
words, people judged all comments to be evaluative regardless of style, and this 
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interpretation bias may partly or wholly explain the evaluative retrieval style in 
subjects’ free recall responses. 
Experiment 5 
We now have two sets of converging evidence that people interpret evaluative 
feedback as more negative or harsh than directive feedback. This difference in 
harshness might explain why evaluative feedback is more effectively recalled than 
directive feedback. For example, Cutumisu and Schwartz (in press) recently showed 
that middle school students were significantly better at remembering negative 
feedback than they were at remembering positive feedback. In short, it is possible that 
subjects in our paradigm are simply best at remembering the most negative or harsh 
sounding feedback comments, regardless of their temporal orientation. 
In Experiment 5 we tested this harshness mechanism directly, by trying to 
completely reverse the evaluative recall bias using new, adapted feedback scripts. 
Specifically, in some of our new scripts the evaluative feedback was intentionally 
written to seem harsher than the directive feedback (as was apparently the case in our 
prior experiments), but in other scripts, the directive feedback was written to seem 
harsher than the evaluative feedback. If perceived harshness, rather than temporal 
orientation per se, is the mechanism responsible for the evaluative recall bias, then we 
should expect to see the bias reverse entirely whenever directive comments are the 
harsher type. But if the effect does not reverse under these conditions, then we should 
conclude that differences in perceived harshness cannot explain the evaluative recall 
bias. 
Method 
Subjects. A total of 66 subjects completed the study online in exchange for a 
£5 voucher. This sample size was based on a power analysis, which showed that 66 
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subjects would permit the detection of a medium-sized interaction (f = .25) in a 2 x 2 
mixed-measures design, assuming power = .80, alpha = .05, and a correlation of zero 
between repeated-measures. In total, 6 subjects were removed from analyses and 
replaced with new subjects, because they failed to follow task instructions (e.g., 
recalling the filler task instructions rather than the feedback). The final dataset 
comprised data from 49 females, 16 males, 1 other; Mage = 29.11, SD = 13.48, Range 
= 18-74). Each was randomly assigned to either the Evaluative-harsher condition (n = 
34), or the Directive-harsher condition (n = 32). 
Materials. We created a new set of feedback scripts for use in this 
experiment, adapted from those used in the earlier experiments. Specifically, we re-
wrote each of the 40 original comments (20 evaluative, 20 directive) in two ways, one 
intended to seem ‘supportive’, and the other intended to seem ‘stern’, whilst 
otherwise carrying the same general critique. For example, one supportive-evaluative 
comment was “…you could have used evidence a bit more consistently to support 
your arguments”, whereas the stern-evaluative variant of this comment was “…you 
failed to consistently use even a trace of evidence to support your arguments”. The 
supportive-directive variant was “…you could try to make more consistent use of 
evidence to support your arguments”, whereas the stern-directive variant was “you 
should consistently use at least some trace of evidence to support your arguments.” 
To ensure that these new materials effectively manipulated perceived harshness, we 
piloted them with a separate group of volunteers. 
Pilot study. Forty volunteers who were not involved in the main study (30 
females, 10 males; Mage = 31.75, SD = 10.41, Range = 19-57) took part online in 
exchange for a £5 voucher. Each was shown all 80 feedback comments in a random 
sequential order (i.e., 20 comments presented in the Supportive-Evaluative, 
		 40	
Supportive-Directive, Stern-Evaluative, and Stern-Directive styles). For each 
comment, subjects rated their agreement with the statement “If I received this 
feedback comment, I would think it is negative or harsh” (1 = Not at all; 7 = Very 
much).  
Mirroring our analysis of our original materials, reported above, evaluative 
feedback comments were judged as significantly more harsh (M = 3.01) than directive 
comments (M = 2.78), F(1, 39) = 60.55, p < .001, η 2p = .61, d = 0.55, 95% CI on d 
[0.37, 0.74]. Confirming the effectiveness of our manipulation, “Stern” feedback 
comments were also considered significantly more harsh (M = 3.89) than were 
“Supportive” comments (M = 1.91), F(1, 39) = 362.86, p < .001, η 2p = .90 , d = 3.80 
[2.87, 4.73]. Importantly, all four kinds of comments were judged to differ 
significantly from one another in terms of harshness. In particular, Stern-Evaluative 
comments were judged as more harsh (M = 4.03) than were Supportive-Directive 
comments (M = 1.82), t(39) = 20.57, p < .001, d = 4.17 [3.16, 5.17]. Stern-Directive 
comments were judged as more harsh (M = 3.74) than were Supportive-Evaluative 
comments (M = 1.99), t(39) = 16.13, p < .001, d = 3.25 [2.42, 4.06].  
Having confirmed the effective manipulation, we created four new feedback 
scripts using these new materials (see the online supplemental materials). In the two 
Evaluative-harsher scripts (version A and version B as in earlier experiments, with the 
evaluative vs. directive style of each comment counterbalanced across versions), the 
evaluative comments were always stern and the directive comments were always 
supportive, thus replicating the scenario apparently seen in Experiments 1-4. In the 
two Directive-harsher scripts, the evaluative comments were always supportive and 
the directive comments were always stern.  
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Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 3, with the exception 
that we used the new Evaluative-harsher and Directive-harsher feedback scripts in 
place of the original scripts. Subjects saw one of the four scripts at random. 
Data coding. The data were coded in the same way as in previous 
experiments, and a second coder coded 20% of responses. The inter-rater agreement 
was very high: number of evaluative comments recalled in an evaluative style (r = 
.97); the number of directive comments recalled in a directive style (r = .93); the 
number of evaluative comments recalled in a directive style (r = .86); and the number 
of directive comments recalled in an evaluative style (r = .86). The analyses below are 
therefore based on the first coder’s data. 
Results 
We conducted a 2 (Condition: Evaluative-harsher vs. Directive-harsher) x 2 
(Feedback style: evaluative vs. directive) x 2 (Retrieval style accuracy: correct vs. 
incorrect) mixed-measures ANOVA on the number of feedback comments recalled, 
with the first factor manipulated between-subjects and the latter factors manipulated 
within-subjects.  
Overall, as Figure 5 shows, we replicated the evaluative recall bias: subjects 
recalled significantly more of the evaluative feedback than of the directive feedback, 
F(1, 64) = 5.30, p = .02, 2p = .08, d = 0.37, 95% CI on d [0.05, 0.69]. They also 
recalled more feedback comments in the correct style than in the incorrect style, F(1, 
64) = 19.72, p < .001, η2p = .24, d = 0.81 [0.42, 1.19], and a significant interaction 
effect showed that they reproduced feedback in an evaluative style more frequently 
than in a directive style, F(1, 64) = 62.66, p < .001, η2p = .50, d = 1.39 [0.97, 1.80]. 
Follow up paired t-tests showed that subjects reproduced evaluative comments in the 
correct, evaluative style significantly more often than they reproduced evaluative 
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comments in the incorrect, directive style, t(65) = 8.78, p < .001, d = 1.56 [1.12, 
2.00]. Of all evaluative comments that were recalled, 89% were recalled as 
evaluative, and 11% as directive. However, subjects reproduced directive comments 
in the correct, directive style less often than in the incorrect, evaluative style, t(65) = -
2.05, p = .04, d = -0.39 [-0.77, -0.01]. Of all directive comments that were recalled, 
38% were recalled as directive, and 62% as evaluative.  
 
Figure 5. Recall of evaluative and directive feedback in Experiment 5, split according 
to retrieval style accuracy and script condition. Error bars are 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals, calculated separately for each script condition (Loftus & 
Masson, 1994). 
 
Importantly, Figure 5 also shows that the results were highly comparable in 
the Evaluative-harsher condition and the Directive-harsher condition. As a reminder, 
if the evaluative recall bias were driven by differences in the perceived harshness of 
the comments, then we should see a switch to a directive recall bias in the Directive-
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harsher condition. But this was not the case. In fact, the condition x feedback type 
interaction was very small and not statistically significant, F(1, 64) = 0.93, p = .34, 
η2p = .01, thus suggesting that the harshness of the comments cannot explain the 
evaluative recall bias. There was no other significant main effect or interaction 
involving condition (all p > .09, all η2p < .05). 
Experiment 6 
 As well as testing the harshness mechanism directly, Experiment 5 also 
confirms that the evaluative recall bias can be replicated using different feedback 
scripts. Nevertheless, even in Experiment 5 the scripts we used were still similar to 
those used in the earlier experiments. We therefore carried out a final experiment 
using entirely different feedback scripts to extend the generalizability of the findings. 
Furthermore, this time we recruited a subject sample of 9- to 10-year old children: a 
group who just like adults, often have difficulties in remembering feedback that they 
know should help them to improve (Hargreaves, 2012). Extending our research with 
child subjects is potentially valuable because it could help us to begin tracing the 
roots of the evaluative recall bias. Developmental neuroscience research suggests that 
before around age 11, areas of the brain involved in cognitive control typically 
respond more to positive than to negative feedback during learning, whereas the 
opposite is true during adulthood (van Duijvenvoorde, Zanolie, Rombouts, 
Raijmakers, & Crone, 2008). Although our evaluative vs. directive manipulation does 
not map neatly onto a negative vs. positive distinction, nevertheless these findings 
may lead us to predict that children aged 9 to 10 would process critical feedback in a 
qualitatively different way to adults. Like in Experiments 3-5 then, in Experiment 6 
we showed our child subjects a piece of generic written feedback and subsequently 
asked them to recall as much detail as they could.  
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Method 
Subjects. A total of 46 children (25 females and 21 males, Mage = 9.80, SD = 
0.40, Range = 9-10, five children did not give their age) from a school in the south-
east of England took part during class, without compensation. 
Materials and procedure. The procedure was largely identical to Experiment 
3, but the materials were provided on paper rather than via a computer, and we 
developed new feedback scripts in collaboration with the subjects’ class teachers to 
make the feedback more accessible and appropriate to the children. These feedback 
scripts were shorter than those used in Experiments 1-5 (both versions = 139 words), 
and they described developmentally relevant writing issues such as the appropriate 
use of capital letters. Both versions of the feedback can be found in the online 
supplemental materials. Subjects were told that the feedback had been received by 
another child, and were asked to read it carefully. Next they completed a similar filler 
task as in the previous experiments, for a total of 5 min. This task was presented as a 
“puzzle sheet” and subjects were asked to complete as many of the puzzles as they 
could within the allotted time. Following the filler task, subjects were given a further 
5 min to write down as much of the feedback as they could remember. At the end of 
the study we asked subjects to report, by ticking the appropriate box on their sheet, 
whether they prefer to receive comments on their work that (a) tell them how they 
have done on that piece of work, or that (b) tell them how to improve for next time. 
Data coding. Both the first and second coders coded 100% of the recall data. 
The inter-rater agreement was very high: number of evaluative comments recalled in 
an evaluative style (r = .96); the number of directive comments recalled in a directive 
style (r = .98); the number of evaluative comments recalled in a directive style (r = 
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.92); and the number of directive comments recalled in an evaluative style (r = .91). 
The analyses below are therefore based on the first coder’s data. 
Results 
In total, 74% of the children told us that they prefer receiving directive 
feedback, whereas just 26% said they prefer receiving evaluative feedback. And yet, 
even though the consensus was clearly in favor of preferring directive feedback, 
Figure 6 shows that subjects nevertheless recalled significantly more of the evaluative 
feedback than of the directive feedback, F(1, 45) = 16.90, p < .001, η2p = .27, d = 0.76 
[0.36, 1.16]. That is to say, we were able to replicate the evaluative recall bias both in 
a different subject population, and using completely different stimulus materials from 
the other experiments. Like in Experiments 3-5, this bias emerged despite the 
feedback apparently being destined for a stranger, rather than for the subjects 
themselves. 
Figure 6. Recall of evaluative and directive feedback in Experiment 6, split according 
to retrieval style accuracy. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals 
(Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
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Subjects recalled more feedback comments in the correct style than in the 
incorrect style, F(1, 45) = 13.22, p = .001, η2p = .23, d = 0.78 [0.33, 1.23], but it is 
noteworthy that this time there was no significant interaction effect, F(1, 45) = 0.79, p 
= .38, η2p = .02, d = -0.21 [-0.67, 0.26]. In other words, unlike in our previous 
experiments with adult subjects (excepting the between-subjects conditions in 
Experiment 4), these children had no overall tendency to recall feedback in an 
evaluative rather than directive style. Of those evaluative comments that the children 
recalled, 58% were reproduced in the correct evaluative style, and 42% in the 
incorrect directive style. Of those directive comments that the children recalled, 77% 
were reproduced in the correct directive style, and 23% in the incorrect evaluative 
style. We comment on this difference in findings between experiments shortly. 
Experiments 1-6 effect size analyses 
In recent years, influential figures in psychological science have 
recommended a shift in how we report and interpret statistical findings, moving away 
from focusing solely on p-values, and instead paying greater attention to effect size 
estimates (e.g., Cumming, 2013). Taking a weighted average across all six of our 
experiments, the evaluative recall bias amounted to subjects recalling 46% more 
evaluative than directive feedback. To put this difference in standardized terms, we 
conducted a random effects mini meta-analysis of the data, the results of which are 
illustrated in Figure 7a. This meta-analysis gives a weighted effect size estimate for 
the evaluative recall bias of d = 0.63 [0.48, 0.77], p < .001. 
Recall that in most of our experiments, subjects also tended to adopt an 
evaluative retrieval style, systematically reproducing the feedback comments in an 
evaluative style irrespective of how they were actually presented. Taking weighted 
averages across all six experiments, of all the directive feedback recalled, 50% was 
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reproduced in an incorrect, evaluative style; in contrast, of all the evaluative feedback 
recalled, only 23% was reproduced in an incorrect, directive style. A second random-
effects mini meta-analysis, illustrated in Figure 7b, gives a weighted effect size 
estimate for the evaluative retrieval style of d = 0.76 [0.32, 1.20], p < .001. 
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Figure 7. Forest plots illustrating standardized and meta-analyzed effect size data for 
(A) evaluative recall bias and (B) evaluative retrieval style across Experiments 1-6. 
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals around individual values of d. 
 
 
 
A	
B	
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General Discussion 
 Learners who can habitually remember the feedback they receive should in 
principle have a strong advantage as they strive to improve their skills. It has widely 
been argued that future-oriented directive feedback is more valuable to learners than 
is past-oriented evaluative feedback; however, our data indicate two crucial 
counterpoints. First, even though the wording of both forms of feedback was closely 
similar, directive feedback was less likely than evaluative feedback to be recalled by 
the adults and children in our studies. Our item analysis of Experiments 1-4 illustrates 
this point concretely, showing how small differences in wording often had sizeable 
effects on the likelihood of recall. Second, even when adults (but not children) did 
successfully remember directive feedback comments, those comments were very 
often misremembered as criticisms of prior performance (i.e., as evaluative) rather 
than guidance on future improvement. In short, we have good cause to believe that 
these memory biases are sizeable and robust in the kinds of contexts we have studied. 
Notably, the preferential recall of evaluative over directive feedback is the 
exact opposite of the effect we predicted. Indeed, in a small informal survey and again 
in Experiment 4, we found that our participants largely predicted the opposite effect, 
too. The direction of the effect is puzzling then, not least because it seems at odds 
with the finding that people typically recall information more effectively when 
oriented toward the future (e.g., Klein et al., 2010, 2011). What is more, our data lend 
little support to several theoretical interpretations of why the bias might occur.  
First, the bias occurred even when we told subjects to prioritize finding out 
how they could improve in future, and it was not exaggerated when we told them to 
prioritize finding out how they had performed (Experiment 2). This finding suggests 
that the bias is not driven by subjects’ assumptions about which feedback comments 
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were more important to encode. Second, the bias occurred when subjects read another 
fictional person’s feedback, rather than believing that the feedback pertained to their 
own persuasive writing (Experiments 3-6). This finding suggests that the bias is not a 
result of subjects being disproportionately interested in information on how they 
performed on the writing task, relative to information on how to improve. It also 
suggests that the bias is not driven by concreteness or self-reference effects on 
memory that bolster the encoding of evaluative information, because when reading 
another person’s feedback, both evaluative and directive comments should have been 
equally concrete and equally self-relevant. Likewise, in Experiments 3-6 neither type 
of feedback should have invoked so-called information avoidance, and so our findings 
there suggest that this is not the responsible mechanism. In Experiments 1 and 2, there 
was little evidence that the bias was related to individual differences in (trait) 
achievement goal orientation, which provides some initial cause to doubt the role of 
stable motivational factors. In Experiment 4 we replicated the effect even in a 
between-subjects design, a finding that points away from an attentional capture 
mechanism, albeit more direct tests of this mechanism would be valuable. We found 
good evidence that evaluative feedback is perceived as harsher than directive 
feedback, yet the data from Experiment 5 suggest that these differences in harshness 
cannot explain the evaluative recall bias. And finally, observing the bias among 
children in Experiment 6 suggests that the bias is not learned through relatively 
formative experiences in education. We cannot rule out the role of even earlier 
experiences, of course, but this finding does suggest a mechanism rooted in more 
basic cognitive processes.  
So in light of all these direct and indirect tests of theoretical accounts, how 
then might we otherwise explain this unexpected yet consistent effect? Future work 
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should examine the extent to which the evaluative recall bias is a retrieval effect (i.e., 
people are better able to retrieve evaluative feedback from memory), versus an 
encoding effect (i.e., people recall evaluative feedback better because they are more 
capable of committing it to memory). If evaluative feedback were encoded more 
effectively, then we might expect people to be more able to subsequently recognize 
this feedback, yet in Experiments 1 and 2, we found no reliable differences between 
evaluative and directive feedback in terms of recognition memory. This finding might 
therefore offer preliminary evidence that the effect in fact occurs at retrieval rather 
than encoding. Stronger and more direct tests of this question are needed before 
drawing firm conclusions though, especially given that subjects’ recognition 
responses could plausibly have been contaminated by completing the free recall test. 
One as-yet untested retrieval-based account is that when attempting to retrieve 
feedback from memory, people selectively search for evaluative information, a 
strategy that could interfere with their ability to retrieve any directive feedback stored 
in memory. A direct test of this selective memory search mechanism might involve 
disrupting subjects’ search-set, perhaps by instructing them to reproduce evaluative 
and directive comments separately. We are currently exploring this possibility. 
Whatever the causal mechanism, these findings show that future-orientation 
does not always benefit memory; in this case it had quite the opposite effect. Gaining 
a better understanding of why this is the case may provide substantial contributions to 
theory on the directive and adaptive functions of episodic remembering. Moreover, it 
will be necessary to address the extent to which this memory bias generalizes across 
various real-world feedback scenarios: when there are higher-stakes involved in 
successfully implementing the advice, for example; when the initial task (e.g., 
persuasive writing) is lengthier and more meaningful; when the feedback is more 
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richly encoded; or when the delay-to-test is longer. To the extent that the memory bias 
could generalize across some different contexts, further studies may permit the design 
of interventions for supporting learners in remembering directive feedback more 
effectively, or in translating evaluative feedback into future actions. Whereas 
directive feedback is not always inherently more valuable than evaluative feedback, 
an ideal scenario should in principle be one wherein people can remember both kinds 
effectively. 
Our secondary focus here was on whether people would tend to systematically 
misremember feedback in a directive or an evaluative style. Systematic patterns of 
misremembering of information can often tell us about the kinds of inferences people 
have spontaneously made when processing that information (Brewer, 1977; Chan & 
McDermott, 2006; Garry et al., 2007; Klepacz et al., 2016). One might hope that upon 
reading evaluative criticism, learners would spontaneously infer what they needed to 
do differently in future. If so, we might expect that in many instances they would later 
mistakenly believe they had read directive feedback. The systematic pattern we found 
in our studies with adult subjects was generally the opposite, pointing to an evaluative 
retrieval style. These findings suggest that in fact, when receiving directive feedback, 
adult subjects were often spontaneously inferring what had been done badly in the 
writing task. Our analysis of our study materials offers us a plausible account of this 
bias: people intuitively read the intent of feedback as evaluative, regardless of style. 
Specifically, we found that subjects judged the intent of directive feedback to be both 
evaluative and directive, whereas they perceived the intent of evaluative feedback to 
be purely evaluative. 
Notably, as Figure 7 shows, the retrieval style bias was far more 
heterogeneous in magnitude than was the evaluative recall bias, and it did not appear 
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in the between-subjects design in Experiment 4, thus suggesting a relatively larger 
contribution of contextual factors. Indeed, we did not find the evaluative retrieval 
style bias among the children in Experiment 6, which may perhaps indicate that 
children typically read feedback in a more literal sense than do adults, and are less 
likely to read subtext into a feedback giver’s directive language. It is possible that 
subjects’ tendency to infer an evaluative intent to feedback mirrors the kinds of 
feedback they are most accustomed to receiving. We are unaware of existing data 
sources to validate this idea, but it is reasonable to speculate that children may more 
regularly receive developmental guidance compared to adult learners. More work 
with a developmental focus may elucidate the basis of systematic biases in people’s 
feedback retrieval style. 
It is clear that these findings raise many questions, but perhaps most important 
is this: Could these strong effects in people’s recall of feedback ultimately translate 
into behavioral effects? That is, would a student be more likely to subsequently act 
upon evaluative feedback than upon directive feedback, all else being equal, and 
could these small changes in wording lead to genuine, measurable differences in 
students’ subsequent performance? Answering these questions demands field studies, 
with data collected at multiple time-points and with generalizability assessed across 
different kinds of meaningful tasks. If performance consequences can be observed, 
then this unexpected cognitive bias could alter how much we stand to benefit from 
receiving feedback, shaping skill development far beyond the formal education 
context. 
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Supplemental Materials (Online only) 
 
Table S1. Experiment 1. Correlation coefficients of relationship between subjects’ 
achievement goal orientations, and outcome measures from the recall and recognition 
tasks (N = 61).  
 
 
a Total evaluative comments recalled, minus total directive comments recalled 
b Total comments reproduced in an evaluative style, minus total comments reproduced 
in a directive style 
c Total evaluative errors in recognition, minus total directive errors in recognition 
 
 
  
 Achievement Goal Orientation 
 Mastery-
approach 
Mastery-
avoidance 
Performance-
approach 
Performance-
avoidance 
Total feedback 
recalled 
-.17 (p = .19) .09 (p = .49) -.09 (p = .50) -.00 (p = .98) 
Evaluative 
recall biasa 
-.13 (p = .31) -.10 (p = .43) .04 (p = .74) .02 (p = .86) 
Evaluative 
retrieval styleb 
-.17 (p = .19) -.17 (p = .19) -.17 (p = .19) -.17 (p = .19) 
Evaluative 
recognition 
biasc 
-.08 (p = .55) -.05 (p = .71) -.04 (p = .78) .00 (p = .99) 
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Table S2. Experiment 2. Correlation coefficients of relationship between subjects’ 
achievement goal orientations, and outcome measures from the recall and recognition 
tasks (N = 85). 
 
a Total evaluative comments recalled, minus total directive comments recalled 
b Total comments reproduced in an evaluative style, minus total comments reproduced 
in a directive style 
c Total evaluative errors in recognition, minus total directive errors in recognition 
 
 Achievement Goal Orientation 
 Mastery-
approach 
Mastery-
avoidance 
Performance-
approach 
Performance-
avoidance 
Total feedback 
recalled 
.16 (p = .15) .20 (p = .06) .05 (p = .66) .06 (p = .58) 
Evaluative 
recall biasa 
.11 (p = .30) -.05 (p = .64) .12 (p = .29) .15 (p = .18) 
Evaluative 
retrieval styleb 
-.20 (p = .07) -.13 (p = .24) -.08 (p = .48) -.10 (p = .39) 
Evaluative 
recognition 
biasc 
-.11 (p = .32) -.13 (p = .25) -.01 (p = .96) .02 (p = .84) 
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Table S3. Item analysis of subjects’ free recall responses in Experiments 1-4.  
 
Evaluative feedback comment Recall rate Directive feedback comment Recall rate 
your responses tended to favour breadth at the 
expense of sufficient depth of detail 
50.0% 
(86/172) 
you should aim to be more balanced, to avoid 
favouring breadth at the expense of sufficient depth of 
detail 
39.2% 
(65/166) 
 
you sometimes neglected to follow arguments 
through and instead left them unexplained 
37.8% 
(65/172) 
make sure you follow arguments through without 
leaving them unexplained 
25.3% 
(42/166) 
you didn't always demonstrate a sophisticated 
awareness of the issues you covered 
10.8% 
(18/166) 
you should aim to demonstrate a more sophisticated 
awareness of the issues you cover 
3.5% 
(6/172) 
you were not often especially specific about the 
practical implications of the issues you discussed 
7.8% 
(13/166) 
this can be improved by being more specific about the 
practical implications of the issues you discuss 
4.1% 
(7/172) 
your arguments lacked some originality in places 30.8% 
(53/172) 
there is room for your arguments to demonstrate more 
originality in places 
18.1% 
(30/166) 
You did not always try to provoke your reader’s 
thinking, and focused instead on arguments that they 
would expect 
37.8% 
(65/172) 
you could try to provoke your reader's thinking more, 
by focusing on arguments that they would find 
unexpected 
20.5% 
(34/166) 
your responses were not always presented in a 
scientific style 
30.1% 
(50/166) 
your responses should be presented in a more 
consistently scientific style 
26.7% 
(46/172) 
on occasion your arguments sounded somewhat 
personal rather than objective 
54.2% 
(90/166) 
wherever possible try to make sure that your 
arguments sound objective rather than personal 
35.5% 
(61/172) 
you did not always use evidence to support your 
arguments 
41.3% 
(71/172) 
you need to make stronger use of evidence to support 
your arguments 
38.0% 
(63/166) 
Your work suggested that you did not look back over 
it to check that you had backed up all of your 
assertions 
16.3% 
(28/172) 
You could do this by looking back over your work and 
checking that you have backed up all of your 
assertions 
6.0% 
(10/166) 
I did not find all of your arguments wholly persuasive 23.5% 
(39/166) 
you might take additional efforts to ensure that all of 
your arguments are wholly persuasive. 
5.2% 
(9/172) 
there was not always a lot of strength or impact in 12.7% you could particularly aim to strengthen the impact of 12.8% 
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your concluding statements (21/166) your concluding statements (22/172) 
there was not enough critical evaluation of your 
ideas and arguments 
11.6% 
(20/172) 
you should try to include more critical evaluation of 
your ideas and arguments 
8.4% 
(14/166) 
you didn't always think about possible 
counterarguments to your position and defend 
against them 
36.0% 
(62/172) 
you could try to think more about possible 
counterarguments to your position and defend against 
them 
30.7% 
(51/166) 
the structuring of your arguments was a little unclear 
in places 
21.1% 
(35/166) 
the structuring of your arguments is something that 
could be improved in places 
15.1% 
(26/172) 
there was not always a clear sense of where your 
points were leading 
24.7% 
(41/166) 
make sure there is always a clear sense of where your 
points are leading 
8.1% 
(14/172) 
sometimes the way you made your points was not 
concise enough 
21.5% 
(37/172) 
sometimes the way you make your points could be 
more concise 
22.3% 
(37/166) 
you sometimes said in multiple sentences what you 
could potentially have said in just one 
48.8% 
(84/172) 
avoid saying in multiple sentences what you could 
potentially say in just one 
33.7% 
(56/166) 
there were a few examples of [grammar and 
punctuation] errors 
36.1% 
(60/166) 
you should ensure to find and remove any [grammar 
and punctuation] errors 
38.4% 
(66/172) 
you did not consistently use commas and semi-colons 
when appropriate 
62.7% 
(104/166) 
you could make sure that you consistently use commas 
and semi-colons when appropriate 
53.5% 
(92/172) 
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Feedback scripts used in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and the Mixed feedback condition 
of Experiment 4. Evaluative comments are highlighted in yellow; directive 
comments are highlighted in blue (highlighting was not used in the actual study 
materials). In Experiment 4, the evaluative (yellow) comments from script 
Version 1 and script Version 2 were combined in the Evaluative-only condition. 
The directive (blue) comments from script Version 1 and script Version 2 were 
combined in the Directive-only condition. 
 
Version 1.  
 
Substance 
I found your responses on these issues very interesting and thought-provoking, and 
they showed a good amount of thought and consideration. That said, your responses 
tended to favour breadth at the expense of sufficient depth of detail. That is, you 
sometimes neglected to follow arguments through and instead left them unexplained. 
Furthermore, you should aim to demonstrate a more sophisticated awareness of the 
issues you cover. For instance, this can be improved by being more specific about the 
practical implications of the issues you discuss. Finally, I felt that your arguments 
lacked some originality in places. You did not always try to provoke your reader’s 
thinking, and focused instead on arguments that they would expect. Overall the 
substance of your responses was strong despite these specific issues. 
Style 
You demonstrated an engaging and mature writing style, and I had just a few 
suggestions to make in this regard. Specifically, your responses should be presented 
in a more consistently scientific style. In particular, wherever possible try to make 
sure that your arguments sound objective rather than personal. Another issue was that 
you did not always use evidence to support your arguments. Your work suggested that 
you did not look back over it to check that you had backed up all of your assertions. 
As a result, you might take additional efforts to ensure that all of your arguments are 
wholly persuasive. To this end, you could particularly aim to strengthen the impact of 
your concluding statements. Finally, in general there was not enough critical 
evaluation of your ideas and arguments. For example, you didn't always think about 
possible counterarguments to your position and defend against them. In general the 
presentation style of your responses was impressive, though, and shows a degree of 
flair. 
Format 
This was an area with which your responses were generally strong. I did find, though, 
that the structuring of your arguments is something that could be improved in places. 
So, for instance, make sure there is always a clear sense of where your points are 
leading. Additionally, sometimes the way you made your points was not concise 
enough. One example was that you sometimes said in multiple sentences what you 
could potentially have said in just one. Lastly, although your grammar and 
punctuation were generally very good, you should ensure to find and remove any 
errors. For example you could make sure that you consistently use commas and semi-
colons when appropriate. Overall, you presented your ideas in a way that captured 
attention and interest. 
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Version 2. 
 
Substance 
I found your responses on these issues very interesting and thought-provoking, and 
they showed a good amount of thought and consideration. That said, you should aim 
to be more balanced, to avoid favouring breadth at the expense of sufficient depth of 
detail. That is, make sure you follow arguments through without leaving them 
unexplained. Furthermore, you didn't always demonstrate a sophisticated awareness 
of the issues you covered. For instance, you were not often especially specific about 
the practical implications of the issues you discussed. Finally, I felt that there is room 
for your arguments to demonstrate more originality in places. To do this, you could 
try to provoke your reader's thinking more, by focusing on arguments that they would 
find unexpected. Overall the substance of your responses was strong despite these 
specific issues. 
Style 
You demonstrated an engaging and mature writing style, and I had just a few 
suggestions to make in this regard. Specifically, your responses were not always 
presented in a scientific style. In particular, on occasion your arguments sounded 
somewhat personal rather than objective. Another issue is that you need to make 
stronger use of evidence to support your arguments. You could do this by looking 
back over your work and checking that you have backed up all of your assertions. As 
a result. I did not find all of your arguments wholly persuasive. In particular, there 
was not always a lot of strength or impact in your concluding statements. Finally, in 
general you should try to include more critical evaluation of your ideas and 
arguments. For example, you could try to think more about possible counterarguments 
to your position and defend against them. In general the presentation style of your 
responses was impressive, though, and shows a degree of flair. 
Format 
This was an area with which your responses were generally strong. I did find, though, 
that the structuring of your arguments was a little unclear in places. So, for instance, 
there was not always a clear sense of where your points were leading. Additionally, 
sometimes the way you make your points could be more concise. One suggestion 
would be to avoid saying in multiple sentences what you could potentially say in just 
one. Lastly, although your grammar and punctuation were generally very good, there 
were a few examples of errors. For example you did not consistently use commas and 
semi-colons when appropriate. Overall, you presented your ideas in a way that 
captured attention and interest. 
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Feedback scripts used in Experiment 5 
 
Evaluative-harsher, Version 1. 
 
Substance 
I found your responses on these issues very interesting and thought-provoking, and 
they showed a good amount of thought and consideration. That said, your responses 
tended to favour breadth and were disappointingly shallow in terms of detail. That is, 
you neglected to follow arguments through and instead you left them inadequately 
explained. Furthermore, you should aim to more fully demonstrate how sophisticated 
your awareness is of the issues you cover. For instance, you should ideally be a little 
less vague about the practical implications of the issues you discuss. Finally, your 
arguments were lacking in any smallest sense of originality. You made virtually no 
effort to provoke your reader's thinking, and focused instead on entirely obvious 
arguments. Overall the substance of your responses was strong despite these specific 
issues. 
Style 
You demonstrated an engaging and mature writing style, and I had just a few 
suggestions to make in this regard. Specifically, your responses could be presented in 
a more scientific style. In particular, try to make sure that your arguments sound 
objective rather than personal. Another issue was that you failed to consistently use 
even a trace of evidence to support your arguments. Your work clearly showed that 
you had not even looked back over it, to check that you had backed up all of your 
weak assertions. As a result, you might try to ensure that all of your arguments are 
wholly persuasive. To this end, you could aim for a more distinct impact in your 
concluding statements. Finally, there was insufficient critical evaluation to 
compensate for the weaknesses in your ideas and arguments. For example, you didn't 
stop to consider possible counterarguments to your position, and actually defend 
against them. In general the presentation style of your responses was impressive, 
though, and shows a degree of flair. 
Format 
This was an area with which your responses were generally strong. I did find, though, 
that the structuring of your arguments could be slightly improved next time. So, for 
instance, ensure to always give a fully clear sense of where your points are leading. 
Additionally, the way you made your points was rambling, showing very little regard 
for conciseness. One example was that you sometimes said in multiple sentences what 
a good writer could have said in one sentence. Lastly, although your grammar and 
punctuation were generally good, you should ensure to find and remove any notable 
errors. For example you could make sure to consistently use commas and semi-colons 
when appropriate. Overall, you presented your ideas in a way that captured attention 
and interest. 
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Evaluative-harsher, Version 2. 
 
Substance 
I found your responses on these issues very interesting and thought-provoking, and 
they showed a good amount of thought and consideration. That said, you might try to 
avoid favouring breadth, and instead take opportunities for greater depth of detail. 
That is, you could think about making sure you follow arguments through, instead of 
leaving them unexplained. Furthermore, you didn't demonstrate even a minimally 
sophisticated awareness of the issues you covered. For instance, you were incredibly 
vague about the practical implications of the issues you discussed. Finally, your 
arguments could aim to demonstrate a clearer sense of originality. You could do more 
to provoke your reader's thinking, by focusing on arguments that they would not 
expect. Overall the substance of your responses was strong despite these specific 
issues. 
Style 
You demonstrated an engaging and mature writing style, and I had just a few 
suggestions to make in this regard.  Specifically, you made little effort to present your 
responses in a scientific style. In particular, many of your arguments were dreadfully 
personal rather than objective. Another issue is that you could try to make more 
consistent use of evidence to support your arguments. You could do this by looking 
back over your work, and checking that you have tried to back up all of your good 
suggestions. As a result, I did not find most of your arguments even the slightest bit 
persuasive. In particular, there was a distinct lack of any impact in your concluding 
statements. Finally, you could try to include more critical evaluation to strengthen 
your ideas and arguments. For example, you could try to reflect more on possible 
counterarguments to your position, and defend against them. In general the 
presentation style of your responses was impressive, though, and shows a degree of 
flair. 
Format 
This was an area with which your responses were generally strong. I did find, though, 
that the structuring of your arguments was woefully unclear sometimes. So, for 
instance, you often gave no coherent sense of where your points were leading. 
Additionally, the way you make your points could be less wordy, placing greater 
emphasis on conciseness. One suggestion is to avoid saying in multiple sentences 
what you could potentially say in just one sentence. Lastly, although your grammar 
and punctuation were generally good, there were a few shameful examples of errors. 
For example you did not show the capability to use commas and semi-colons when 
appropriate. Overall, you presented your ideas in a way that captured attention and 
interest. 	
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Directive-harsher, Version 1. 
 
Substance 
I found your responses on these issues very interesting and thought-provoking, and 
they showed a good amount of thought and consideration. That said, your responses 
tended to favour breadth and missed some opportunities for greater depth of detail. 
That is, you didn't always think to follow certain arguments through and instead left 
them unexplained. Furthermore, you should aim to demonstrate at least a minimally 
sophisticated awareness of the issues you cover. For instance, try not to be so 
incredibly vague about the practical implications of the issues you discuss. Finally, 
your arguments did not tend to demonstrate a clear sense of originality. You could 
have done more to provoke your reader's thinking, as you focused mainly on 
arguments that they might expect. Overall the substance of your responses was strong 
despite these specific issues. 
Style 
You demonstrated an engaging and mature writing style, and I had just a few 
suggestions to make in this regard. Specifically, you must make more effort to present 
your responses in a scientific style. In particular, make sure that your arguments are 
objective rather than dreadfully personal. Another issue was that you could have used 
evidence a bit more consistently to support your arguments. Your work suggested that 
you had not fully looked back over it, to check that you had backed up all of your 
good suggestions. As a result, you must work to ensure that your arguments are even 
the slightest bit persuasive. To this end, you should avoid having such a distinct lack 
of impact in your concluding statements. Finally, there could have been more critical 
evaluation to strengthen your ideas and arguments. For example, you didn't always 
reflect on possible counterarguments to your position, and defend against them. In 
general the presentation style of your responses was impressive, though, and shows a 
degree of flair. 
Format 
This was an area with which your responses were generally strong. I did find, though, 
that the structuring of your arguments could be less woefully unclear next time. So, 
for instance, do give at least some coherent sense of where your points are leading. 
Additionally, the way you made your points was sometimes wordy, not always 
placing enough emphasis on conciseness. One example was that you sometimes said 
in multiple sentences what you could potentially have said in just one sentence. 
Lastly, although your grammar and punctuation were generally good, you really must 
find and remove any shameful errors. For example you should show the capability to 
use commas and semi-colons when appropriate. Overall, you presented your ideas in 
a way that captured attention and interest. 
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Directive-harsher, Version 2. 
 
Substance 
I found your responses on these issues very interesting and thought-provoking, and 
they showed a good amount of thought and consideration. That said, you must avoid 
favouring breadth whilst being disappointingly shallow in terms of detail. That is, you 
really must learn to follow arguments through without leaving them inadequately 
explained. Furthermore, you didn't always fully demonstrate how sophisticated your 
awareness is of the issues you covered. For instance, you were occasionally a little 
vague about the practical implications of the issues you discussed. Finally, your 
arguments need to demonstrate at least some small sense of originality. You must 
make efforts to provoke your reader's thinking, by focusing on arguments that are not 
entirely obvious. Overall the substance of your responses was strong despite these 
specific issues. 
Style 
You demonstrated an engaging and mature writing style, and I had just a few 
suggestions to make in this regard. Specifically, your responses were not always 
presented in a scientific style. In particular, on occasion your arguments sounded 
somewhat personal rather than objective. Another issue is that you should consistently 
use at least some trace of evidence to support your arguments. You should do this by 
looking back over your work, and checking that you have at least backed up all of 
your weak assertions. As a result, I did not find that all of your arguments were 
wholly persuasive. In particular, there was sometimes room for more impact in your 
concluding statements. Finally, you must include sufficient critical evaluation to 
compensate for the weaknesses in your ideas and arguments. For example, you should 
stop to consider possible counterarguments to your position, and actually defend 
against them. In general the presentation style of your responses was impressive, 
though, and shows a degree of flair. 
Format 
This was an area with which your responses were generally strong. I did find, though, 
that the structuring of your arguments was slightly unclear sometimes. So, for 
instance, you didn't always give a fully clear sense of where your points were leading. 
Additionally, the way you make your points should be less rambling, showing greater 
regard for conciseness. One suggestion is to avoid saying in multiple sentences what a 
good writer could say in one sentence. Lastly, although your grammar and 
punctuation were generally good, there were a few notable examples of errors. For 
example you did not consistently use commas and semi-colons when appropriate. 
Overall, you presented your ideas in a way that captured attention and interest. 
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Feedback scripts used in Experiment 6 
 
Version 1.  
 
I thought that your work was interesting to read. However, you did not always 
remember to use capital letters. Next time think about where it might be helpful to 
add commas. Also, I felt you use the word ‘said’ too many times in your work. 
Remember to look back over your work for spelling mistakes. Your handwriting was 
not always the easiest to read in some places. Always remember to underline the date 
and title. I felt you could have used paragraphs in your work. I was impressed by the 
ideas you came up with, however next time make sure your ideas link together. I did 
not feel you fully understood the task. Next time please complete the task in full. I can 
tell that you tried really hard and you should be proud of the work you’ve done. 
 
Version 2.  
 
I thought that your work was interesting to read. However, you need to remember to 
use capital letters correctly. There were places where it would have been helpful to 
add commas. Also, you should try to think of different words to use other than ‘said’. 
I noticed there were some spelling mistakes in your writing. You could improve your 
handwriting so your work is easy to read. You did not underline the date and title. It 
would be good to use paragraphs in your work. I was impressed by the ideas you 
came up with, however some of your ideas did not link together. In future, make sure 
you fully understand the task. You did not finish the task in full. I can tell that you 
tried really hard and you should be proud of the work you’ve done. 
 	
 
